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Abstract 
There is growing consensus among animal studies scholars that fictional representations of animals, far 
from representing a discrete site of literary theory, offer insights into broader sociocultural forces and 
systems relevant to human-animal relations. This article aims to contribute to this developing corpus of 
interdisciplinary knowledge, and to aid attempts by creative practitioners to self-reflexively challenge the 
human/animal binary, by laying groundwork for a typological spectrum that might enable assessment of 
the relative anthropocentrism manifested by different conceptions of fictional animals. I consider 
philosophical and ethical questions surrounding attempted representations of animal subjectivity in 
human language, and employ key theoretical concepts comprised of ideological anthropocentrism, 
linguistic anthropomorphism, and impossible fiction. I propose that a useful typological spectrum might 
proceed on the basis that all fictional animals are anthropomorphised to some degree; that the relative 
anthropocentrism reflected by a given fictional animal (i.e. whether the adopted anthropomorphic 
strategy is ‘better’ or ‘worse’) depends on how effectively the animal represents an individual, embodied 
subjectivity not dependent for meaning on human consciousness; and that a practical enquiry in 
considering whether a fictional animal depends for meaning on human consciousness is how far the 
animal’s imagined subjectivity is in fact impossible (e.g. by virtue of the attribution of impossibly human 
traits or knowledge). 
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Abstract: There is growing consensus among animal studies scholars that fictional representations of 
animals, far from representing a discrete site of literary theory, offer insights into broader 
sociocultural forces and systems relevant to human-animal relations. This article aims to contribute 
to this developing corpus of interdisciplinary knowledge, and to aid attempts by creative 
practitioners to self-reflexively challenge the human/animal binary, by laying groundwork for a 
typological spectrum that might enable assessment of the relative anthropocentrism manifested by 
different conceptions of fictional animals. I consider philosophical and ethical questions surrounding 
attempted representations of animal subjectivity in human language, and employ key theoretical 
concepts comprised of ideological anthropocentrism, linguistic anthropomorphism, and impossible 
fiction. I propose that a useful typological spectrum might proceed on the basis that all fictional 
animals are anthropomorphised to some degree; that the relative anthropocentrism reflected by a 
given fictional animal (i.e. whether the adopted anthropomorphic strategy is ‘better’ or ‘worse’) 
depends on how effectively the animal represents an individual, embodied subjectivity not 
dependent for meaning on human consciousness; and that a practical enquiry in considering whether 
a fictional animal depends for meaning on human consciousness is how far the animal’s imagined 
subjectivity is in fact impossible (e.g. by virtue of the attribution of impossibly human traits  
or knowledge).  
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There is growing consensus among animal studies scholars that fictional representations of 
animals, far from representing a discrete site of literary theory, offer insights into broader 
sociocultural forces and systems relevant to human-animal relations. In What Animals Mean in 
the Fiction of Modernity, for example, Philip Armstrong uses a historically expansive range of 
literary texts (including Robinson Crusoe, Moby Dick, The Old Man and the Sea, Disgrace and 
Life of Pi) to explore:  
the relationship between human-animal narratives and the social practices and 
conditions from which  they emerge; the evidence of exchanges between  human and 
non-human forms of agency; and the documentation of shifts in the emotional and 
affective engagements between humans and other animals. (2) 
Susan McHugh describes the broader context for her enquiry into companion-species narrative 
histories, Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines, in analogous terms: ‘literary and visual 
narrative forms [at times] become inseparable from shifts in the politics and sciences of species, 
such that questions about animal narratives come to concern the formal and practical futures of 
all species life’ (3). This potential of fictional animals to reveal aspects of human-animal relations 
embedded in the societies that produce and consume them leads animal studies scholars to press 
for an interdisciplinary approach to their interpretation. As editor David Herman writes in a 
recent volume interrogating twentieth and twenty-first century animal-related literature:  
fictional texts centering on modes of entanglement between humans and other animals 
give rise to ‘transdisciplinary’ questions for research, the proper articulation of which 
will require the combined efforts of scholars in the arts and humanities, the social 
sciences, and the natural sciences. (2)  
 The present discussion aims to contribute to this developing corpus of interdisciplinary 
knowledge relating to the sociocultural origins and impacts of fictional animal representations. It 
does so by seeking to lay groundwork for a typological spectrum that might enable assessment of 
the relative anthropocentrism manifested by different conceptions of fictional animals. Such a 
spectrum, I believe, may provide important insights not only into how anthropocentric values 
are propagated in fictional forms commonly accepted as benign, indeed as promoting empathy 
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towards other species, but also how creative practitioners may self-reflexively employ fictional 
animals as a means of promoting post-anthropocentric consciousness and species plurality.1  
 I adopt an interdisciplinary lens consistent with animal studies’ foundational rejection of 
accepted categories of humanist thought (Gross and Vallely 3). I consider first philosophical and 
ethical questions surrounding attempted representations of animal subjectivity in human 
language; in particular, whether such attempts are foreclosed from the outset, are necessarily 
anthropocentric, or are inherently ethically irresponsible. I then discuss questions relevant to 
how a typological spectrum of the relative anthropocentrism of fictional animals might be 
framed, using the theoretical concepts of linguistic anthropomorphism (as developed by Eileen 
Crist in the field of behavioural science) and impossible fiction (as interpreted by postmodern 
literary theorist Jan Alber and philosopher Daniel Nolan). Finally, I seek to illustrate how a 
typological spectrum of the kind I propose might be applied to critically interpret fictional 
animals created by Julian Barnes and John Steinbeck respectively.   
 
Animal Studies and the (Im)Possible Representation of Animals in Fiction 
 
Thinking about fictional animals outside the scope of traditional literary theory exposes at the 
outset a threshold problem. In what sense can a fictional animal represent a real one? As 
McHugh identifies, the discipline of literary theory appears to be organised by the studied 
avoidance of questioning ‘the metaphorical animal’s ways of inhabiting literature without 
somehow being represented therein’, even though this work ‘present[s] tremendous 
opportunities for recovering and interrogating the material and representational problems 
specific to animality’ (6). As discussed in detail below, a key element of my project here 
involves seeking to distinguish between the attribution of possible and impossible subjectivities 
                                                     
 
 
1 The term ‘post-anthropocentrism’ is adopted from Rosi Braidotti’s The Posthuman. 
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onto fictional animal representations. A critical anterior question, then, is whether animal 
subjectivity can be represented in fiction at all. 
 In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida charges that the discourses of 
probably all philosophers and theoreticians (Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas he 
references by name) reflect ignorance of what it is like to be ‘addressed’ – especially naked – by 
a real animal (12-13). He describes his experience being beheld naked by his pet cat – a ‘real 
cat’, he says, not ‘the figure of a cat…silently enter[ing] the bedroom as an allegory for all the 
cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions, literature and fables’ – and 
how in that moment he has offered to his sight ‘the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or 
the ahuman, the ends of man…[I]n these moments of nakedness, as regards the animal, 
everything can happen to me, I am like a child ready for the apocalypse’ (6). For Derrida, then, 
literary creations in the guise of animals are implicated in humanism’s erasure of true animal 
alterity: an alterity which, when witnessed without a protective humanist lens, at once exposes 
as misconception the humanist divide between human and animal, and reveals the essential 
vulnerability of all life. Derrida’s evocation of the erasive effect of humanist discourses including 
literature on non-human life is not limited to ‘animals’ as a supposedly homogeneous collective, 
nor to groupings classified by species, but extends to individual animal subjectivity. Derrida 
rejects the notion that his cat represents ‘the immense symbolic responsibility with which our 
culture has always charged the feline race’ or appears as ‘the exemplar of a species called “cat”, 
even less so of an “animal” genus or kingdom’ (9). Even before identification as male or female, 
he writes, his cat ‘comes to me as this irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space, 
into this place where it can encounter me, see me, even see me naked. Nothing can ever rob me 
of the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized’ 
[emphasis added] (9). Thus, any attempted conceptualisation of an animal or animals in fiction 
(as in other discourses) must, Derrida seems to suggest, result in the individual and collective 
occlusion of the real animal(s) upon which such conceptualisation might be modelled. A similar 
point appears to be asserted by Jean Baudrillard: ‘In all this – metaphor, guinea pig, model, 
allegory…– animals maintain a compulsory discourse. Nowhere do they really speak, because 
they only furnish the responses one asks for. It is their way of sending the Human back to his 
circular codes, behind which their silence analyzes us [emphasis added]’ (137-38).  
REFLECTIONS ON ANTHROPOCENTRISM, ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND IMPOSSIBLE FICTION 
 
165 
 Insofar as Derrida and Baudrillard argue that the act of representing or conceptualising 
animals in fiction necessarily leads to erasure of individual animal subjectivity, it seems to me 
this goes too far. Thomas Nagel may be correct in the assertion, discussed in J.M. Coetzee’s The 
Lives of Animals, that a human is incapable of knowing what it is like for a bat to be a bat, for 
example (Coetzee 1999, 129). But I would argue this is quite different from saying that a human 
is incapable of distinguishing between contrasting conceptualisations of the subjectivity of an 
animal, based on how likely it is that a given conceptualisation might (or might not) reflect the 
subjectivity experienced by an animal of the relevant kind. Coetzee’s character Elizabeth 
Costello responds to Nagel by saying (referring to a human character she has created):  
[i]f I can think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed, then I can 
think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with 
whom I share the substrate of life. (133)  
This claim has been said to ‘fall flat’, on the grounds that ‘[l]iterature cannot, by itself, move 
from an imaginary to an objective phenomenology’ (Bernaerts et al. 76). But irrespective of 
whether what Costello says is literally true, what is significant here is its corollary: to create an 
animal character that portrays convincingly the lived experience of a real animal calls for a 
process of imagining, language craft and political awareness equivalent to that involved in the 
creation of a convincing human character. It follows axiomatically that there must be degrees of 
success: some fictional animals must be more like real animals than others. Costello elsewhere 
discusses the poems ‘The Jaguar’ and ‘Second Glance at a Jaguar’ by Ted Hughes. In these 
poems, Costello says:  
we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but from the way he moves. The body is 
as the body moves, or as the currents of life move within it. The poems ask us to 
imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit that body. (147)  
I would suggest that a fictional jaguar susceptible of being understood in these terms provides a 
surely more authentic representation of the subjectivity experienced by a real member of his or 
her species than does, to choose a conspicuous example, a wolf depicted as impersonating a 
grandmother.  
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 It is important to note an additional point. If it is accepted, as I have argued it should be, 
that some fictional representations of animals may come closer to the subjective experience of 
real animals than others, from one perspective a difficult ethical question arises. Kari Weil notes 
a commonality between animal studies and trauma studies, in that, bearing in mind the violence 
done to animals and the difficulties humans face in trying to understand how animals experience 
that violence, ‘[b]oth raise questions about how one can give testimony to an experience that 
cannot be spoken or that may be distorted by speaking about it’ (6). More broadly, 
contemporary tensions surrounding ‘identity politics’ and the potential for authors to effect 
‘cultural appropriation’ through the representation in fiction of the life-worlds of other humans 
(Greenidge) – raised notably by books such as Little Bee, a 2009 book written by Englishman 
Chris Cleave from the perspective of a fourteen-year old Nigerian girl – arguably have particular 
relevance for attempts to inhabit and relate the actual lived experiences of animals.   
 I would argue, however, that although articulating these concerns may be helpful in 
directing writers engaged in creating fictional animals to respect the potential political sensitivity 
of the enterprise – just as Derrida’s and Baudrillard’s critiques are helpful in urging vigilance 
against the essential human/animal divide underlying humanism – nevertheless, it is important 
to guard against allowing political awareness to develop into paralysis. Mainstream fictional 
animals are created and consumed on a vast scale. The novels Black Beauty, Watership Down, 
Charlotte’s Web and Jonathan Livingstone Seagull figure among the best-selling of all time, for 
example, while at the time of writing three of the four highest-grossing films of 2016 comprise 
Zootopia, Finding Dory and The Jungle Book. But real animals born into the age of the 
anthropocene face death and suffering through industrial farming, experimentation, human 
recreation and habitat loss to a stunning and unprecedented degree (Wadiwel 5-7). In the 
circumstances, the uncritical assumption that popular representations of fictional animals are 
universally harmless or indeed promote empathy (Simons 120) seems to me uncomfortably 
optimistic. I would argue that animal studies as an interdisciplinary field should not confine itself 
to passive consideration of the sociocultural significance of fictional representations of animals, 
but should rather proactively empower and encourage creative practitioners to use such 
representations self-reflexively, with a view perhaps to diluting the impact of anthropocentrism, 
and promoting species plurality and inter-species respect. 
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 Much of the insightful and ground-breaking work produced to date by animal studies 
scholars in connection with fictional animals – Jay Johnston and Fiona Probyn-Rapsey’s edited 
volume Animal Death and Aaron Gross and Anne Vallely’s Animals and the Human Imagination 
may be added to the titles noted above by way of illustration – have tended to focus on discrete 
interrogations of the role that select works play in reflecting, maintaining or disrupting the 
human/animal divide. In the next section, I discuss how a more generally applicable typological 
spectrum might be framed with a view to identifying how different conceptions of fictional 
animals may serve: either to reinforce the erasure of animal alterity and subjectivity Derrida 
locates in the humanist philosophical tradition; or, conversely, to represent in some measure the 
subjectivity of individual animals, which I think can be employed self-reflexively in fiction to 
destabilise humanism’s anthropocentric human/animal binary. 
 
Towards a Typological Spectrum of Fictional Animals: Anthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism 
and Impossible Subjectivities 
 
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (ODP) defines as ‘anthropocentric’: ‘[a]ny view 
magnifying the importance of human beings in the cosmos, e.g. by seeing it as created for our 
benefit’. A more sophisticated conception developed by critical animal studies theory treats 
anthropocentrism as an ideology which, by means of an essential human/animal binary, operates 
to ‘maintain the centrality and priority of human existence through marginalizing and 
subordinating nonhuman perspectives, interests and beings’ (Weitzenfeld and Joy 4-5). A 
critical element of the process by which this ideology is sustained involves directly and indirectly 
classifying non-human beings as essentially aimless: ‘only achiev[ing] meaning instrumentally 
through human consciousness’ (6).  
 In the previous section, I sought to establish that fictional portrayals of animals should be 
recognised across a spectrum: that the project of representing in fiction an animal subjectivity 
corresponding to that of a real animal should not be seen as foreclosed from the outset, but 
rather as realisable to some degree, depending on an equivalent process of imagining, language 
craft and political awareness to the creation of a human fictional character. It seems to me to 
follow from the above ideological conception of anthropocentrism that if a fictional animal 
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possesses a sufficiently convincing subjectivity as a unique non-human being, he or she can be 
successfully represented as having meaning apart from human consciousness, and thus as 
constituting a profound opposition to anthropocentrism. Conversely, however, a fictional 
animal whose representation operates to maintain the centrality of human existence and/or to 
subordinate or marginalise non-human beings – by reinforcing either a human-animal dualism or 
a human-animal continuum – must be, to the extent of that maintenance or subordination, 
anthropocentric. The concept of anthropocentrism thus marks out the two ends of my proposed 
spectrum: ‘worse’ fictional animals (anthropocentric) and ‘better’ (anti-anthropocentric).   
 Moving on to anthropomorphism, there is considerable uncertainty at present within 
the fields of literary theory and animal studies in relation to both precisely what stylistic 
techniques this idea refers to, and whether, from the perspective of challenging the 
human/animal binary, it is part of the problem or the solution. Gillian Beer’s interesting 
comparative analysis of fictional animals appears to assume that anthropomorphism refers in 
most if not all cases to the investing of animal characters with the power of language; she writes 
that the ‘paradox of representation through language, of “literary beasts”, is what particularly 
interests me here, as I have indicated in my title “Animal Presences: Tussles with 
Anthropomorphism”’ (313). Allan Burns’ approach appears perhaps not inconsistent with 
Beer’s, but places contrasting emphasis on whether a fiction’s narrative voice is in the first or 
third person; ‘[f]irst-person animal narratives, such as Black Beauty, are overtly 
anthropomorphic fantasies and cannot operate within or even congruent to the framework of 
natural science’, he writes, whereas ‘an objectively maintained third-person point of view that 
focuses exclusively on exterior action and rigorously excludes any hint of interiority would 
correspond with an anthropocentric or behaviorist position’ (344). John Simons distinguishes 
‘trivial’ from ‘strong’ anthropomorphism, where the former ‘treats animals as though they were 
people but [does] not seek to use this strategy to point [sic] any moral or teach any example’ and 
the latter ‘deals with animals as if they were humans…either to show how the non-human 
experience differs from the human or to create profound questions in the reader’s mind as to the 
extent to which humans and non-humans are really different’ (119-20). Bearing in mind the 
ODP definition of anthropomorphism – relevantly, the representation of animals ‘as having 
human form, or as having human thoughts and intentions’ – I would suggest that the apparently 
insoluble difficulties involved in trying to reconcile these contrasting formulations reveal 
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difficulties inherent in attempting to distinguish a ‘human’ thought or intention from an ‘animal’ 
thought or intention. To illustrate, consider the story, ‘the chicken crossed the road’. Does the 
chicken represent trivial anthropomorphism per Simons’ definition – on the basis that ‘crossing 
the road’ implicitly imputes a human intention to the chicken – or is the chicken 
anthropocentric, following Burns, owing to an objectively maintained third-person point of view 
focused exclusively on exterior action? If the story were changed to ‘I am a chicken and I crossed 
the road’, would the shift to the first person narrative voice be regarded as sufficient to endow 
the chicken with the power of language, hence satisfying Beer’s apparent conception of 
anthropomorphism? Or would the shift mean that for Burns the story is no longer 
anthropocentric, but an anthropomorphic fantasy incapable of operating within the framework 
of natural science? Or would Simons consider that as a first person narrative the story has moved 
from ‘trivial’ to ‘strong’ anthropomorphism, because now the author is creating a profound 
question in the reader’s mind about how different humans and chickens really are? These 
questions may be somewhat facetious, but I would suggest they are nevertheless difficult to 
answer, and highlight serious shortcomings with the referenced attempts to define 
anthropomorphism.  
 It is perhaps the opacity surrounding anthropomorphism that leads to starkly different 
assessments of whether it is good or bad. Weil, for example, notes that ‘as a process of 
identification, the urge to anthropomorphize the experience of another, like the urge to 
empathize with that experience, risks becoming a form of narcissistic projection that erases 
boundaries of difference’ (19). But she also observes that animal studies’ turn to ethics has 
‘brought a new focus on the notion of anthropomorphism…as a potentially productive, critical 
tool that has similarities to empathy within recent historical research’ (19). Simons is guilty of 
no such equivocation; anthropomorphism, he writes, ‘is perhaps the most powerful, important 
and multifaceted representational tool for the development of a discourse which might enable 
literature to develop as speciesism becomes an increasingly unacceptable model for the world 
within which literature is generated and which it reflects’ (139).  
 Eileen Crist’s work regarding anthropomorphism in the linguistics of behavioural 
science provides, I believe, a means of resolving both the question of whether fictional animals 
are anthropomorphised – they always are – and whether anthropomorphism is good – it 
depends. For Crist, the accepted ‘vernacular of human action’ involves three elements: 
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meaningfulness (actions have subjective significance for the actor); authorship (actors are able to 
act or refrain from acting according to their own agency and will); and continuity (actions by an 
individual or group are coherently connected and combine together in the stream of the living) 
(1-10). Depictions of animal subjectivity begin, according to Crist, not with direct attribution of 
individual mentality, but with anterior elements of lexicon, grammar and reasoning consistent 
with animal actions being meaningful, authored and continuous (as human actions are). An 
important illustration for Crist is the writing of Charles Darwin, for example the following 
passage:  
nothing is more common than for animals to take pleasure in practicing whatever 
instinct they follow at other times for some real good. How often do we see birds which 
fly easily, gliding and sailing through the air obviously for pleasure . . . Hence it is not at 
all surprising that male birds should continue singing for their own amusement after the 
season for courtship is over. (Darwin, The Descent of Man, in Crist, 36) 
Through the imputation of pleasure and amusement, Darwin attributes to the birds an 
experience of their own flying and singing as subjectively meaningful; intentionality with respect 
to when they choose to fly and sing; and ultimately an ontological significance located in the 
same temporal plane as the human. Thus, Crist explains, such accounts are both 
anthropomorphic and clearly distinguishable from the mechanomorphism of classical ethology, 
which in specialised technical vocabulary (for example, ‘innate releasing mechanism’ (“IRM”) or 
‘parental investment’) treats animal behaviour as a set of mechanised responses to physiological 
states and environmental stimuli. For Crist, where mechanomorphic writing implicitly 
characterises animals as mindlessly compelled to act by a technically defined grid of forces 
extrinsic to lived experience, Darwin’s brand of anthropomorphism advances a powerful view 
of animal life as meaningful, authored and continuous, and thereby yields an imposing and 
cogent perspective on understanding animals in semantic kinship with the human world  
(202-04).  
 It has been observed, perhaps correctly, that Crist’s argument is ‘rich with irony’, 
implying as it does that Darwin’s commitment to Cartesian empiricism is at odds with a 
Cartesian understanding of animal mind (Boehrer 12). Be that as it may, I would argue that 
Crist’s analysis provides a critical starting point for consideration of anthropomorphism in the 
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context of fictional animals. For one thing, by focusing on linguistic constructions of animal 
exteriority, rather than interiority, Crist’s insistence that anthropomorphism can play a 
constructive role in promoting kinship has much in common with the way Elizabeth Costello 
talks about Ted Hughes’ poetic jaguar. Cary Wolfe has pointed out that humanism relies on an 
artificial, abstracted concept of ‘the human’, which is ‘achieved by escaping or repressing not 
just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by 
transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether [emphasis added]’ (xv). When 
Costello describes the jaguar ‘ask[ing] us to imagine our way into that way of moving, to inhabit 
that body’, she identifies how precisely the brand of anthropomorphism urged by Crist has the 
potential to destabilise the human/animal binary, simply because humanist discourses generally 
foreclose an awareness of embodied existence at all. 
 More generally, it is difficult to imagine how a fictional animal – that is, an animal 
represented as having a corporeal existence in the relevant fictional world, as against existing 
solely as image or metaphor – could be represented otherwise than as to some degree acting in 
ways that are meaningful, authored and continuous. The technical vocabulary of ethology is 
arguably impossible to sustain on its own terms in fiction. To illustrate, consider a story that 
recounts, ‘Harry studied the parental investment of the honeyeaters nesting in the forest’; even 
a reader acquainted with the behavioural science-based interpretation of parental investment (as 
referring to a parent bird’s ability to invest in other offspring (Kvarnemo 452)) is likely to be put 
on notice of questions surrounding why Harry has found himself designating the actions of the 
honeyeaters – whose nesting is implicitly meaningful, authored and continuous – according to 
an objectifying scientific paradigm. Crist’s insights therefore seem to suggest that animals in 
fiction are almost invariably, perhaps necessarily, anthropomorphised according to her 
conception of the term. The corollary of this conclusion, I would argue, is that at inception most 
if not all fictional animals are equipped in linguistic terms with the possibility of some kind of 
individual subjectivity; in contrast to an ethological mechanomorphism that precludes animal 
subjectivity from the outset, how far fiction subsumes animal subjectivity into an 
anthropocentric world view may depend on the extent of ontological erasure within the  
text itself. 
 To enquire into how different techniques of representation may erase the subjectivity of 
fictional animals, I propose that the concept of ‘impossible’ (or ‘unnatural’) fiction may have 
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considerable value. Literary theorist Jan Alber has demonstrated that, while the impossible is 
used self-consciously in experimental postmodernist metafiction such as Philip Roth’s The 
Breast (in which the protagonist transforms into a giant breast), similar kinds of metaphysical 
impossibility recur throughout the history of literature in more conventional contexts (for 
example the speaking beast in animal fables or time travel in science fiction) (4-7). Philosopher 
Daniel Nolan makes an analogous point with respect to the personification of nation-states or 
abstractions like death or duty:  
[o]ur ability to understand fictions, report on them, engage with them, and so on is not 
restricted to those fictions that describe possible goings-on…impossible fictions are not 
a peripheral case caused by unusual experimentation with fictional devices, but can be 
found in traditional and widespread kinds of cases. (68) 
 As I explore in more detail in the two case studies below, ‘impossibility’ may provide a 
touchstone by which to measure how far the characterisation of a given fictional animal works to 
promote anthropocentrism by erasing that animal’s potential (as, in Crist’s terms, an 
anthropomorphic creation whose actions are meaningful, authored and continuous) to possess a 
unique subjectivity not dependent for meaning on human consciousness. To provide a passing 
illustration, I would argue that a wolf impersonating a grandmother performs meaningful, 
authored and continuous acts, but is so impossibly imbued with human abilities and qualities that 
the potential for individual subjectivity as a wolf with which he is endowed at inception is 
erased, probably in its entirety, by the manner of his portrayal. An erasure such as that of the 
fairy tale wolf must, I would suggest, be considered an epitome of anthropocentrism: the wolf’s 
physical characteristics are hived off and impossibly instrumentalised for human purposes with a 
manifest disregard for wolf subjectivity easily equivalent to that reflected by the destruction of 
real animals for their meat or skin. The wolf’s subjectivity is made meaningful only as a 
metonymic representation of the human. On this view, the point made by Alber and Nolan that 
impossible fictions have long been commonly accepted by readers, in a variety of contexts, 
supports an inference that such impossible representations of fictional animals may be widely 
enjoyed without their anthropocentric import attracting concern, even notice.  
 In summary, then, I propose that a useful typological spectrum might proceed on the 
basis that all fictional animals are anthropomorphised to some degree; that the relative 
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anthropocentrism reflected by a given fictional animal (i.e. whether the adopted 
anthropomorphic strategy is ‘better’ or ‘worse’) depends on how effectively the animal 
represents an individual, embodied subjectivity not dependent for meaning on human 
consciousness; and that a practical enquiry in considering whether a fictional animal depends for 
meaning on human consciousness is how far the animal’s imagined subjectivity is in fact 
impossible (for instance by virtue of the attribution of impossibly human traits or knowledge).     
 A number of further clarifications in relation to this idea of impossibility are important. 
In describing what he means by impossibility, Nolan deliberately avoids portrayals of animals:  
[w]hile there are interesting questions about whether, for instance, birds could, or do, 
sing love songs to each other, or whether it is possible for bears to grumble about the 
onset of winter…whether these  things are literally impossible would lead us too far 
afield. (60) 
The sense in which I use impossibility respects this caution. As Nolan emphasises, in testing for 
an impossibility in fiction, there should be no room for doubt; it is not an enquiry into technical 
language devices – whether bears grumble – or indeed ‘overt’ anthropomorphism – whether 
birds sing love songs – but rather a question of patent logical or physical impossibility. It will be 
apparent from the alternative conceptions of anthropomorphism discussed above that conferring 
language on fictional animals is sometimes regarded as something of a Rubicon. However, I 
would suggest that a focus on language as language is misplaced. I have two dogs. If I write that 
my Kelpie tells my Border Collie she has been to the park and eaten a liver treat, it seems to me 
there is no necessary erasure of her individual subjectivity as a being, Kelpie, dog or animal. 
Endowing the written representation of my Kelpie with a power of language is, to that extent at 
least, merely a technical device permitting me to communicate in the medium of human writing 
an inter-animal exchange that is, I think, clearly possible. It does not seem to me to affect the 
position whether I write in the third or the first person, just as, to draw on Elizabeth Costello’s 
analogy, choice of narrative voice does not automatically bear upon the success with which a 
human fictional character is created. However, if I write – in first or third person – that my 
Kelpie tells my Border Collie that while at the park she admired the Frank Lloyd Wright-
inspired architecture, or that she tells the postman in the language of English that the Border 
Collie has stolen her bone, then I would suggest that the result in either case is the imputation of 
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patently impossible human understandings and attributes which operate to erase her own 
individual subjectivity and hence to reinforce anthropocentrism.  
 A typological spectrum of the kind I propose is not intended to assume that fiction 
portraying animal characters must be entirely realist. It may well be, for example, that a 
fictional cat could be created whose subjective experiences are readily identifiable by a human 
reader as within the possible realm of potential cat experiences, hence her or his portrayal need 
not be anthropocentric according to my spectrum, irrespective of the fact that she is portrayed 
travelling through time. 
 A final point of clarification concerns the relationship between this notion of 
impossibility and anthropocentrism itself. I think there can be little doubt that a view of the 
cosmos as existing for human benefit reflects a metaphysical impossibility, no more possible than 
that death can exist in human form or that a human can become a breast or travel through time. 
But that is quite different from suggesting that a fictional animal who herself or himself had an 
anthropocentric view of the world would reflect an impossible subjectivity and hence an 
anthropocentric portrayal. It seems to me a representation of a dog or cow or other 
domesticated animal, in particular, might conceivably be drawn as believing the world was 
created for the benefit of humans, without the fictional representation itself constituting an 
anthropocentric representation on the basis of impossibility.   
 
Two Case Studies 
 
To illustrate two different points along my proposed typological spectrum, I have selected 
chapters from Julian Barnes’ A History of the World in 10½ Chapters and John Steinbeck’s The 
Grapes of Wrath. In the former, the first chapter is told – as confirmed in the final sentence – 
from the perspective of a woodworm. The woodworm is represented as communicating directly 
with the reader, and as offering a unique stowaway’s perspective on the journey of Noah’s ark:  
Now, I realize that accounts differ. Your species has its much repeated version, which 
still charms even sceptics; while the animals have a compendium of sentimental myths. 
But they’re not going to rock the boat, are they? Not when they’ve been created as 
REFLECTIONS ON ANTHROPOCENTRISM, ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND IMPOSSIBLE FICTION 
 
175 
heroes…But I am not constrained in that way. I was never chosen. In fact, like several 
other species, I was specifically not chosen. I was a stowaway; I too survived; I 
escaped… (4) 
Barnes’ book as a whole employs a startling range of narrative techniques. The third chapter, for 
example, is written in a voice the reader understands to belong ‘perhaps [to] an official of the 
court’ in sixteenth century France (73); the fifth by an art historian; the eighth in epistolary form 
by an actor addressing his girlfriend; the tenth by a dreamer who wakes in heaven. Yet the 
chapters are linked by ‘connective devices’: for example, the image of the ark or ship as both 
offering protection and imprisoning; the recurring presence of woodworms and reindeers 
(Finney 54-59). Barnes’ overall project appears to involve exploring how, although ‘different 
modes of discourse generate different meanings regardless of their content’ (Finney 59), 
nevertheless even wildly contrasting accounts of different moments in time combine to form 
overarching patterns of meaning. Barnes himself has described the book as ‘like a sequence of 
paintings on a wall…You can get pleasure from each in turn if you want to, but if you look at 
them together, then you see that they amount to one big panel’ (Finney 69).  
 Alber sees Barnes’ woodworm as exemplifying a kind of ‘playful intertextuality’ 
through which ‘postmodernist narratives relate back to the well-known generic conventions of 
beast fables and children’s stories to create a new configuration, namely a speaking animal that 
unites the functions of this impossible blend in traditional genres but also moves beyond them’ 
(70-71). It may be that the woodworm does indeed operate as a self-reflexively postmodern 
literary device, illuminating both the inherent contingency and cumulative effect of historical 
discourse(s) and so contributing to the project of enhancing human self-conception. But Barnes 
makes no attempt to relate the actual subjectivity of a woodworm. As in the excerpt above, 
Barnes’ woodworm possesses a consciousness capable of understanding how histories can charm 
or sentimentalise according to the agenda of the teller; elsewhere, the woodworm recounts in 
the same vein:  
[y]ou aren’t too good with the truth, either, your species…I can see there might be a 
positive side to this wilful averting of the eye: ignoring the bad things makes it easier for 
you to carry on. But ignoring the bad things makes you end up believing that bad things 
never happen. (34) 
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I doubt it is controversial to suggest that such abstract reflections lie outside the subjective 
experience of an actual woodworm. According to the spectrum of anthropomorphism described 
above, then, the potential subjectivity qua woodworm with which Barnes’ creation is invested at 
inception, as a character whose actions are meaningful, authored and continuous, is, I would 
argue, substantially if not completely erased by the impossible attribution of uniquely human 
attributes and knowledge. Implicit in Barnes’ depiction is a characterisation of woodworms as 
playthings for humans to think with: or, in terms of the ideology of anthropocentrism, as only 
achieving meaning instrumentally through human consciousness. Whatever the contribution to 
postmodernist literature, from the perspective of anthropocentrism it seems to me the brand of 
metonymy employed by Barnes does not ‘move beyond’ speaking beast fables at all, but treats 
animal subjectivity with a degree of dismissive entitlement and assumed superiority more or less 
identical to that represented by a grandmother-impersonating wolf.  
 Chapter three of The Grapes of Wrath, embedded amidst the epic narrative of the Joad 
family’s journey from the dusty desolation of Oklahoma to the profit-fuelled wastage of 
California, recounts a single scene: a turtle crossing a highway. The turtle’s progress is 
recounted in a closely focalised, exterior, mostly neutral but at times directly anthropomorphic 
descriptive style: ‘[h]is hard legs and yellow-nailed feet threshed slowly through the grass, not 
really walking, but boosting and dragging his shell along…His horny beak was partly open, and 
his fierce, humorous eyes, under brows like fingernails, stared straight ahead’ (17-18). The 
turtle encounters one hurdle after another: sliding ‘little by little’ up the embankment to the 
highway; a red ant that runs into ‘the soft skin inside the shell’ and is ‘crushed between body and 
legs’; a sedan that swings off the highway to avoid the turtle, causing him to jerk his head into his 
shell; the burning hot surface of the highway; a light truck whose driver swerves to hit him, flips 
him ‘like a tiddly-wink’, spins him ‘like a coin’, and rolls him off the highway; the challenge of 
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righting himself by catching a piece of quartz with his front foot.2 After the turtle’s crossing, the 
chapter closes:  
[t]he turtle entered a dust road and jerked itself along, drawing a wavy shallow trench in 
the dust with its shell. The old humorous eyes looked ahead, and the horny beak opened 
a little. His yellow toe nails slipped a fraction in the dust. (17) 
There is nothing impossible about the scene itself. It would be feasible, I think, to attempt a 
more ambitious exploration of the interior subjectivity of the turtle, in terms of his thoughts and 
feelings, without risking impossible subjectivity of the kind discussed previously. But, bearing in 
mind how depictions of animal exteriority in the vernacular of human action can destabilise the 
human/animal binary according to Crist’s conception of anthropomorphism, such an alternative 
approach would not necessarily result in the character of the turtle presenting a stronger 
challenge to anthropocentrism. The turtle’s actions are clearly meaningful, authored and 
continuous, and, seen independently of the rest of the novel, there is no apparent erasure of his 
individual subjectivity. Indeed, I would suggest that Steinbeck’s description achieves, in 
Elizabeth Costello’s terms, the result that we know the turtle ‘not from the way he seems but 
from the way he moves’: that Steinbeck ‘ask[s] us to imagine that way of moving, to inhabit  
that body’.  
 The problem – a problem which may highlight a more general tension between animal 
studies and traditional literary theory – consists in the turtle, viewed in the context of the novel, 
performing a symbolic function: i.e. symbolising the perseverance of the Joad family and of 
‘Okies’ more generally in their pursuit of a better life in the West of the United States. In fact 
the turtle has been described as ‘[p]robably Steinbeck's most famous use of the symbolic 
epitome’ (Griffin and Freedman, 575). While the practice of animal symbolism may be seen as 
enriching literature and thereby enhancing human self-conception, there is, it seems to me, an 
                                                     
 
 
2 I have adopted the personal pronoun ‘him’ in relation to the turtle for consistency across my discussion; Steinbeck 
alternates between ‘him’ and ‘it’. 
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underlying impossibility analogous to that which characterises anthropocentrism itself. Just as 
real animals surely do not exist for the purpose of enabling humans to benefit by making sense of 
their own condition, a fictional animal which operates to achieve that purpose through 
symbolism must, I think, have the individual subjectivity it might otherwise have possessed, by 
virtue of its actions being meaningful, authored and continuous, at least partially erased. In 
terms of the ideology of anthropocentrism, the attribution of symbolic meaning to the 
subjectivity of the turtle only allows the turtle to achieve meaning instrumentally through 
human consciousness.  
 It seems to me that the role of Steinbeck’s turtle in The Grapes of Wrath is not 
exclusively symbolic. The effectiveness of the portrayal when viewed in isolation, and the way 
the depiction arguably operates more broadly across the novel to break down the human/animal 
binary by illustrating how determination and vulnerability are shared across species; these 
achievements, I think, militate against the anthropocentric import of the turtle’s framing as 
symbol. Nevertheless, while I would suggest that my Steinbeck case study represents a less 
anthropocentric fictional animal than the Barnes case study, the problems associated with animal 




It has been suggested more than once that writing about animals requires navigation between the 
Scylla of anthropomorphism and the Charybdis of anthropocentrism (Burns 344; Pearson and 
Weismantel 17). I have sought to demonstrate that this supposed dichotomy is unhelpful. A 
preferable conceptualisation, I have suggested, is to accept that anthropomorphism is inevitable, 
and to see the challenge more in terms of negotiating a spectrum from ‘worse’ 
anthropomorphism – which buttresses an anthropocentric world view – to ‘better’ 
anthropomorphism – which disrupts anthropocentrism by recognising individual animal 
subjectivity, thereby promoting post-anthropocentric species equivalence and plurality. In so 
doing I have sought to contribute to animal studies’ project of interrogating how representations 
of fictional animals implicate broader sociocultural forces and systems relevant to human-animal 
relations, by identifying how different approaches to constructing fictional animals (including 
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approaches commonly accepted as benign) may convey profoundly anthropocentric meanings. I 
have also proposed how a typological spectrum of fictional representations of animals might be 
framed, with a view to aiding attempts by fiction writers to self-reflexively challenge the 
ideology of anthropocentrism through fiction.  
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